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The US as global attorney
by Gregory J Wallance
Since the end of the Cold War era. the US has assumed the often conflicting? o
roles of global sheriff and global attorney   with increasing tension between 
their competing interests.
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The US Senate's recent rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was condemned by the President and many commentators as 'isolationist/ In fact, the 
defeat of the CTBT does not signal a re-emergence of American 
isolationism but rather marks only the latest in a series of clashes 
between two competing role models for American assertiveness 
in the post-post-Cold War world   the US as global sheriff and 
the US as global attorney, that is, as advocate for international 
law and morality. The problem is not isolationism but the 
increasing tension between the two different means   sheer 
military power, on the one hand, and forceful projection of 
American legal and moral values on the other   by which the US 
influences the behaviour of other countries.
As global lawyer the US has altered the legal cultures, business 
morality, working conditions and human rights practices in 
scores of nations. A factory worker in Thailand, a marketing vice 
president of a Japanese pharmaceutical company, a Zurich bank 
manager, and a French businessman in Moscow live working ando ' o
professional lives that express American legal values. Far more 
than fast food and Hollywood movies, American legal exports 
have affected daily life around the globe.
The US exports its legal values in three principal ways:
* unilateral enforcement of American laws against foreign 
companies and their executives (e.g. the Department of 
Justice's attack on international price fixing cartels);
» multilateral agreement after lengthy diplomacy (e.g. the 
recent OFCD convention prohibiting foreign bribery); and
» non-governmental organisation lobbying and pressure 
(such as that which resulted in highly-publicised changes in 
workplace conditions in Nike and Reebok factories in third 
world countries and an emerging set of international factory 
labour standards).
America's ability to project its legal values to faraway places is 
on a par with its ability to project military force globallv. The 
exported American legal values express the best American 
impulses, including commitment to the rule of law, a sense of 
fairness and equal opportunity, and a dislike of business 
corruption and dishonesty. In short, American legal values are 
quintessential!}' moral ones.
However, the projection of American legal values has already 
created contradictions for American foreign and domestic policy 
because so far the US has been selectively moral, particularly in 
the area of military morality. While the US seeks an 
international consensus on prosecution of foreign businessmen
for antitrust violations, it refuses to sign the International 
Criminal Court Treaty, principally over concern about 
prosecution of American soldiers for war crimes; while it has 
insisted on an international pact to stop bribery, it refuses to 
sign international pacts to outlaw land mines and underground 
nuclear testing; and while its private organisations, with strongO 1C* C»
government support, lobby for international accords outlawing 
child labour, its military, with strong government support, 
opposes international agreement to outlaw child soldiers. As 
demonstrated by the harsh criticism from allies of the US on 
each occasion that the global sheriff beat back an initiative from 
the global lawyer, a posture of selective morality is difficult to 
defend. In important respects the global lawyer and the global 
sheriff do not get along with each other, and how they resolve 
the near schizophrenic tensions between moral impulse and 
military necessity will affect the ability of the US to shape 
international affairs in the post-post-Cold War world.
UNILATERAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN 
LEGAL POWER
One of the more impressive feats of the Kosovo War was the 
ability of the B-2 bomber to fly round-trip bombing runs to 
Yugoslavia from a base in Missouri. The American legal 
equivalent of the B-2 bomber is the Department of Justice's 
Antitrust Division, which has projected American antitrust 
standards to the industrialised world. In recent years, the 
Antitrust Division has poured resources into investigating and 
prosecuting international cartels, over whom it has jurisdiction 
to prosecute so long as any one cartel member sells collusively- 
priced products in the US   a virtual certainty for most cartels.
The results of the Division's cartel bombing have beeno
breathtaking. In 1991, 1 per cent of the corporate defendants in 
criminal antitrust prosecutions brought by the Department of 
Justice were foreign-based. No criminal antitrust charges were 
brought that year against a foreign individual. In 1997, nearly 
fMO-fAirJj of the corporate defendants were foreign-based and 
more than one-fifth of the individual defendants were 
foreigners. The list of convicted foreign companies includes 
Fujisawa (Japan), Roquette Freres (France), Heeren NV (The 
Netherlands), and Hoechst AG (Germany). Last year, two 
European companies, Hoffman-Roche and BASF, pleaded guilty 
to price-Axing of vitamins and paid fines totalling a staggering 
$725 million.
Even foreigners living in countries whose extradition treaties 
do not cover antitrust offences have been forced to answer 
antitrust charges in American courts. These defendants realiseo
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that as indicted fugitives from American law they cannot 
function effectively as international businessmen. After 
negotiating assurances with the Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service (INS) that will allow them to resume travelling into the 
US if they are convicted or plead guilty, many have appeared in 
American courts to answer, usually by a guilty plea, American 
criminal price-fixing charges even though their own countries' 
laws do not make price fixing a crime.
The Antitrust Division's vigorous antitrust enforcement has 
stimulated other countries to develop and enforce their own 
antitrust laws, otten under American tutelage. For example, the 
Antitrust Division staff have provided technical assistance to 
antitrust agencies in 30 countries on four continents, from 
Albania to Zimbabwe. The Division has negotiated co-operation 
agreements and mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) that 
allow the Division to take statements from witnesses in foreign 
countries, obtain documents and other physical evidence, and 
even execute searches and seizures through the Division's 
foreign counterpart. Recently, the US proposed an initiative in 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) to develop tti agreed policy that member countries 
enact and enforce laws prohibiting hard-core cartel activity.
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Even without an international consensus that price fixing is a 
crime, the Antitrust Division's attack on cartels has 
forced foreign companies to adopt American-style 
compliance programs to deter employees from fixing 
prices of goods sold in the US. The days of the 
international market cartels are numbered as more 
and more companies realise that the risk of paying 
fines approaching a billion dollars is not compensated 
by the benefits of cartel activity.
THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH
America's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was enacted in 1977 
in the wake of the Watergate break-in and Lockheed bribery 
scandals. Essentially, the Act prohibited the payment of bribes by 
American companies to foreign government or political party 
officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business and 
required publicly-traded companies to maintain accurate books 
and records. Over the next 20 years American companies lost 
billions of dollars in contracts to foreign competitors whose 
business morality was unconstrained by such a bribery 
prohibition in their own countries. Foreign government officials 
and businessmen privately snickered at the self-imposed 
American business ethics, in the same fashion that their 
merchant ancestors laughed at 17th-century missionaries for 
believing that the heathens in Africa or the Americas should be 
objects of conversion and not exploitation.
In the end, American morality   and business reality1   
triumphed. At the end of 1997 the 29 member nations of the 
OECD and five non-member nations (Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Chile and the Slovak Republic) adopted a 'Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions'. Its preamble is the purest 
expression imaginable of American legal values:
'Bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business 
transactions, including trade and investment, which raises serious moral 
and political concerns, undermines good governance and economic 
development, and distorts international competitive conditions ...'
The Convention requires each signatory to adopt 'effective 
measures' to deter and prevent their citizens from bribing 
foreign public officials for business advantage, including the use 
of 'dissuasive criminal penalties'. It commits the signatories to 
setting up a mechanism to monitor each other's compliance and 
implementation, which means that each signatory nation will be 
actively encouraging   if not pressuring   the other countries to 
fully live up to their obligations under the Convention.
How did this extraordinary transformation in international 
government and business morality come about? Factors include 
the increasing perception that, in the long run, business bribery 
harms the global economy and therefore everyone; a new 
generation in Europe of aggressive magistrates who exposed and 
vigorously prosecuted business and sports scandals (the 
expulsion last year of riders in the Tour de France for drug use 
is only one notable example of the changed atmosphere); and 
the media coverage of such scandals which influenced public 
opinion sufficiently to create a political consensus in favour of 
the Convention. But the overall animating force was American 
diplomacy spurred by pressure from major American companies 
who, through such lobbying organisations as Transparency 
International, demanded a level international-business playing 
field.
One example of the Convention's potential impact arose 
recently when revelations emerged about the bribes and 
gratuities paid to members of the International Olympic 
Committee by cities seeking selection as Olympic venues. In the 
face of the lOC's intransigence and unrepentance, some 
American public officials proposed amending the Convention to 
prohibit bribes to members of the IOC and changing the 
Olympic charter to require that no country can host the games 
unless it has signed the Convention. Recently the IOC indicated 
its receptiveness to being included within the Convention. This 
linkage of the Convention and the Olympic controversy 
demonstrates how other countries may be forced to adopt the 
Convention's standards as the price of entry to the capital 
markets, access to private and public financing, and 
participation in international business and trade organisations, 
not to mention the Olympic movement.
THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL APPROACH
The television personality Kathie Lee Gifford never imagined 
that she would become a symbol for the export of American 
legal values. But in 1996 she was in the news because a line of 
women's clothing bearing her name had been made by under- 
age workers in Central America. Disney experienced 
embarrassing publicity from reports that Chinese factories 
producing Disney-labelled goods paid women working 16 hours 
a day $70 a month. Mattel plants in third world countries were 
called 'sweatshop Barbie' assembly lines. Nike and Reebok, 
among other companies who spend tens of millions of 
advertising dollars to identify their products with clean, youthful 
fun, were similarly embarrassed by news reports that they 11
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exploited third-world child labour As Nike CEO Phillip Knight 
sadly acknowledged:
'The Nike product has become synonymous with slave wages, Jbrced 
overtime and arbitrary abuse.'
During the Cold War, a controversy over third-world factory 
labour standards would never have made it to prime time, but a 
combination of sophisticated American human rights 
professionals, college students and a symbol-driven media 
forced multinational corporations to impose American-style 
workplace standards in factories from Haiti to Pakistan. The 
historic roots of the workplace reform movement can be traced 
to the labour union struggles of the 1930s, the civil rights
oo o
movement of the 1950s and 60s and the contemporary 
international human rights movement. In each of these 
movements a small group of tactically-sawy activists used public 
perception to force the government to enact and enforce laws 
that furthered the movement's goals. Underlying the success of 
each movement was an image that provoked public sympathy: a 
company goon clubbing a striker, southern sheriffs unleashing 
dogs on civil rights demonstrators, or a prisoner without a name 
in a cell without a number.
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SCHIZOPHRENIC TENSIONS
In important respects the global lawyer and the global sheriff 
do not get along with each other, and how they resolve the
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near schizophrenic tensions between moral impulse and 
military necessity will affect the ability of the US to shape 
international affairs in the post-post-Cold War world.
The international workplace movement succeeded because it 
focused on companies whose products derive value from 
corporate or brand images. Reebok simply could not afford to 
have its soccer balls identified with the exploitation of 12-year- 
old Pakistani workers. In response to the adverse publicity 
Reebok created a new central production facility in Pakistan, put 
in place a system of independent monitors and   in a classic 
example of turning necessity into a virtue   affixed 'Made 
Without Child Labour' to its soccer balls. Nike has raised the 
minimum age for employment at its footwear plants to 18 
(other than Vietnam, where 14 year olds can work with parental 
permission), installed new ventilation systems, and reduced 
workers' exposure to lead paint and hazardous chemicals. 
Starbucks Coffee, after picketing by activists over working 
conditions on the Guatemala plantations from which it buys 
some of its coffee beans, issued a revised code of conduct and 
specific action plans for all its supplier countries.
The international workplace movement spawned a variety of 
non-binding legal codes. After prodding by such groups as the 
Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, an 
association of the Clinton Administration, human rights 
organisations, apparel companies and American colleges 
established the Fair Labour Association, which then developed a 
workplace code of conduct reflecting decent working conditions 
and a uniform system of monitoring. If a company meets the 
FLA standards it will be allowed to attach an FLA label to its 
products, including soccer balls and T-shirts. As New YorkI o
Times columnist Thomas Friedman recently wrote:
'The hope is that every college bookstore and major retailer that sells 
sneakers, T-shirts and sweatshirts will insist on selling only FLA- 
labelled products.'
The international workplace movement lacks the sheer 
firepower of the Department of Justice's crusade against cartels 
and the international commitment of the Foreign Bribery 
Convention. Its tactics are inherently self-limiting since 
companies that do not depend on brand or corporate name   
such as producers of raw materials and components purchased 
by the end-user manufacturers   are virtually immune from 
pressure. Voluntary codes, critics have charged, will not protect 
the majority of workers in developing nations because much of 
their country's economic output has no connection with US 
markets.
All true, but premature. Voluntary codes are a beginning and 
it remains to be seen whether the labour standards movement 
will spread beyond the factories run by the multinationals, 
which currently represent about 8 per cent of third-world 
workplaces. But it is difficult to imagine that an electronics 
factory worker in Bien Hoa, Vietnam^ will quietly endure 
working in 100-degree heat, exposure to toxic fumes and 
chemicals, and physical beatings by the foreman while across the 
street Nguyen Thi Dong earns three or four times as much 
money in her Nike factory job, works in a clean, modern, well- 
ventilated room and can report abuse to an independent 
monitor.
THEORY V PRACTICE
The world is still a long way from adopting an American style 
legal system. Few countries would want a civil tort system in 
which multi-billion-dollar verdicts are handed up by juries with 
no more predictability than the roulette tables at the MGM 
Grand in Las Vegas, and equally few countries have the legal 
infrastructure, culture and heritage necessary to support the 
meticulous procedural due process given most criminal 
defendants in American court rooms. But American success in 
emphasising the rule of law in international relations has created 
a situation in which the converted have begun to embarrass the 
preacher.
One example might be called American legal cxccptionalism 
or 'our laws are good enough for you, but yours aren't good 
enough for us'. In some ways, the worst offender is the US 
Supreme Court. In a recent speech on affirmative action to the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Supreme Court 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out that India's Supreme 
Court has cited US court decisions when judging the 
constitutionality of affirmative action measures and that 
German attorneys defending affirmative action measures beforej O
the European Court of Justice have cited international 
covenants. Yet, she observed, the US Supreme Court has 
mentioned the Universal Declaration of Human Rights just five 
times and only twice in a majority decision, the last such citation 
by either the majority or minority being 25 years ago in a 
dissenting opinion by the late Justice Thurgood Marshall. She 
pointed out that when Justice Breyer, in a 1997 dissent, referred 
to federal systems in Europe, the majority responded, 'We think 
such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a 
constitution'. (Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Benjamin Cardozo 
Lecture, 11 February 1999, reprinted in the Record of the
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Association of the Bar of the City of New York, vol. 54, no. 3,275 
May/June 1999, at 308-09.)
While legal exceptionalism has ruffled relatively few feathers 
outside of the legal community, selective morality has created 
something of a backlash. Three times in the last three years the 
global attorney and the global sheriff have fought over an 
international human rights pact and, each time, the global 
sheriff has defeated American participation, to the 
consternation of countries that had borne the brunt of 
American legal power in the international business arena. The 
American claim to legal superiority, implied in the above 
examples of the projection of American legal power, is 
necessarily a claim to the moral high ground. But, as lawyers 
often tell corporate clients implementing legal compliance 
programs, 'do not set standards for your company unless all the 
divisions are willing to meet them'.
In opposing the three human rights pacts, the US inevitably 
created the impression that it chooses only legal and moral 
values   principally business related ones   which suit its 
convenience. The first two pacts were the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention to ban anti-personnel land mines and a protocol 
proposed this year to the 1989 United Nations Convention on 
the flights of the Child, which would have raised the acceptable 
minimum age for military service to 18. The Department of 
Defense opposed the first because land mines were needed to 
adequately defend American soldiers in South Korea from an 
invasion by North Korea and the second because the Pentagon 
recruits 17 year olds (with parental consent). Nonetheless, the 
land mine convention was ratified by nearly every country, 
including every significant military ally of the US for the last 50 
years. The US (joined only by Somalia) still refuses to adopt the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which makes less than 
persuasive its opposition to the protocol.
The worst such gap between the American theoretical 
commitment to the rule of international law and its practice 
emerged when the US found itself allied with Iraq, Libya, Yemen 
and Qatar in voting against the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). During the Rome conference that approved the ICC, the 
US was both diplomatically and legally outmanoeuvred by 
countries supporting it. The so-called 'like minded' states of 
both developed and developing countries that dominated the 
Rome conference, in the manner of high-powered American 
lawyers, countered American objections with subtle changes in 
language which appeared to accommodate American concerns 
that American soldiers on peacekeeping or enforcing missions 
would be the targets of politically-motivated prosecutions (such 
as recognising a 'superior orders' defence when the command at 
issue is not clearly illegal and limiting the court's jurisdiction to 
prosecute soldiers where the soldier's country is 'unable or 
unwilling' to bring charges itself).
Nonetheless, the US was not satisfied and, despite President 
Clinton and Secretary of State Albright's previous support for an 
international war crimes tribunal, the US not only voted against 
the treaty but since then has lobbied against the 60 state 
ratifications required to put it into effect. The US military was 
so opposed to the ICC that, during the Rome Treaty, the 
Secretary of Defense apparently was prepared to call for 
withdrawal of American soldiers from Europe if certain 
proposals were adopted by the Rome Conference (they were
not). To American human rights activists it appeared that, as 
Human Rights Watch executive director Kenneth Roth pointed 
out:
[while 50 years ago] the US took the lead in building modern 
international human rights law lately Washington has been in the 
public eye Jor the obstacles it has raised to its further development'.
Another example of the global attorney-sheriff tension came 
in the Kosovo War, where the US put on an impressive display 
of military power but was unable to dictate the timing of the 
indictment of Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic and his close 
associates by the Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal, to which (unlike 
the ICC) the US had given whole-hearted support. At the time, 
American officials expressed concern, happily unfounded, that 
the indictment would prolong the war by making Milosevic even 
more intractable. But for a time the American military 
momentum seemed to be overtaken by an international legal 
initiative. In effect, the aspirations of the global lawyer had got 
in the way of the global sheriff. Just as with the question of 
international war crimes, land mines and whether 17 year olds 
could serve in the US Army, the roles of global sheriff and global 
attorney could not be reconciled.
The most recent clash of role model was the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. While domestic politics unquestionably played 
an important role in the Senate vote, many of the treaty's 
opponents   including certified non-isolationists Henry 
Kissinger and Senator Richard Lugar   sincerely believed that 
underground testing is necessary to maintain the nation's 
nuclear stockpile and thereby to assure both American security 
and that of the allies who shelter under the American nuclear 
umbrella. In effect, even a small risk that the US could lose its 
nuclear edge was enough to bring about the Senate's first 
explicit repudiation of a major international agreement in 80 
years. Military supremacy, once again, trumped moral 
supremacy.
ABSOLUTISM
Having built belief systems that depend on absolutism, both 
the global sheriff and the global attorney sincerely believe that 
they cannot afford exceptions. ... until both find a way to 
make some exceptions, in other words, to accommodate 
legitimate competing interests, the global sheriff and global 
attorney will continue to feud.
IS RECONCILIATION POSSIBLE?
Can the global sheriff and the global attorney ever find 
reconciliation? The problem is fundamentally a clash of deeply- 
held value systems which sustain themselves by refusing to 
acknowledge that competing interests might have at least some 
merit. Steven Spielberg's remarkable movie about the Battle of 
Normandy, Saving Private Ryan, showed on at least three different 
occasions American soldiers shooting German soldiers who had 
either surrendered or were unmistakably attempting to 
surrender. The global attorney, typically a lawyer committed to 
human rights who perhaps had unearthed mass graves in El 
Salvador, sees a violation of the Geneva Convention and, despite 
the horrific circumstances that motivated the American soldiers, 
concludes that the need for consistency in application of 
international human rights covenants requires a response. The 13
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global sheriff, perhaps a senior officer who had endured similar 
carnage in Vietnam, sees courageous soldiers who acted with 
justification given their horrific circumstances and, although 
acknowledging that both discipline and military advantage 
favour taking prisoners of war and not shooting them, concludes 
that not only is no response required but that any punishment 
would be devastating to morale. Having built belief systems that 
depend on absolutism, both the global sheriff and the global 
attorney sincerely believe that they cannot afford exceptions.
However, until both find a way to make some exceptions, in 
other words, to accommodate legitimate competing interests, 
the global sheriff and global attorney will continue to feud. Thus, 
in the final analysis, the point is not the merits of the 
international human rights pacts or the wisdom of the timing of 
the Milosevic indictment but rather that the global lawyer has, in 
some respects, been too successful. By vigorously promoting and 
enforcing the rule of law in both the business and human rights 
arenas, the US has created an international movement that it can 
no longer control and which conflicts with the American role as 
global sheriff. Whether and how this conflict can be resolved will
become increasingly important to America's willingness to 
intervene in future conflicts, arms control and the promotion of 
the international rule of law   all of which, it is safe to say, will 
have a great deal to do with shaping the international landscape 
in this new century. @
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The Coffin Memorial Lecture on the History of Ideas
Monday 3 April 2000, 6.30pm
Chancellor's Hall, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU
The Hon Justice Carsten Smith 
President of the Norwegian Supreme Court
Judicial Review of Parliamentary Legislation: 
Norway as a European Pioneer
Chair: The Rt Hon Lord Woolf 
Master of the Rolls and Pro Chancellor of the University of London
Admission free and all are welcome. 
Drinks and light refreshments willjollow both lectures
For further information contact Belinda Crothers at the Institute of Advanced Leaal 
Studies, Charles Clore House, 17 Russell Square, London, WC1B 5DR, on 0171 637 1731
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